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judicial favor in the past, it is to be noted that the two most recent
decisions involving retractions have sustained the more drastic type
statutes. Perhaps this represents a new trend in the law of libel. If
so, it is possible that the Oregon statute construed in Holden will be-
come a model for other states. One of the better features of the Oregon
act is that it allows a retraction to preclude recovery of general dam-
ages only for inadvertent libels. Although the Oregon statute re-
quires the plaintiff to plead and prove malice or failure to retract upon
demand, it would perhaps be desirable to establish a presumption
against malice and to require the plaintiff to prove malice in fact. This
would have the effect of taking the issue of good faith from a jury
which might be oversolicitous of the plaintiff.
ANDREW W McTHENIA, JR.
COHABITATION DURING PENDENCY
OF A DIVORCE ACTION
When a court hearing an action for divorce learns that the parties
have cohabited during pendency of such suit, the court is presented
with an interesting question involving conflicting policies. Ordinarily
the courts hold that voluntary cohabitation during the pendency
of the suit bars the suit" and dismiss the action.2 Some courts, though,
have held that while the facts of such cohabitation should be brought
to their attention, their jurisdiction to grant the divorce is not af-
fected.3 In accordance with the latter view it has been held that the
original cause of action may be revived in the same action, after sub-
sequent acts of aggression have taken place, by the filing of a sup-
plemental petition.4
Recently, a Florida District Court of Appeals in Sezferth v. Seiferth5
reached a different result concerning the effect of cohabitation of
the parties during the pendency of a divorce action. A husband sued
'Givens v. Givens, 304 S..W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
-Byrne v. Byrne, 93 N.J. Eq. 5, 114 At. 754 (Ch. 1921); Givens v. Givens, 304
S.W.2d 577 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
'Cabral v. Cabral, 323 Mass. 441, 82 N.E.2d 616 (1948); Tackaberry v. Tacka-
berry, loi Mich. 102, 59 N.W. 400 (1894); Payne v. Payne, 157 Ore. 428, 72 P.2d 536
(1937).
'Huffine v. Huffine, 74 N.E.2d 764 (Ohio C.P 1947).
'132 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Ct. App. ig6i).
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for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty.6 The chancellor granted
the divorce and the wife appealed contending that the court below
should have dismissed the suit because the resumption of cohabita-
tion during its pendency established condonation of the marital of-
fense as a matter of law.7 In affirming the decision below, the District
Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion,8 agreed with the finding of the
chancellor that the defendant wife had not shown the element of
forgiveness implicit in the defense of condonation.9 One judge dis-
sented, being of the opinion that the cohabitation in the marital
home, which admittedly included several acts of sexual intercourse
subsequent to the institution of the divorce proceedings, constituted
condonation as a matter of law.10
The court in the Seiferth case, in its preoccupation with the legal
sufficiency of the defense of condonation," seemingly failed to con-
8It has been held that either a husband or a wife may maintain an action
for divorce based on cruelty. Levy v. Levy, 388 Il. 179, 57 N.E.2d 366 (1944);
Nail v. Nail, 287 Ky. 355, 153 S.W.2d 909 (1941); Persinger v. Persinger, 133 W Va.
312, 56 S.E.2d 110 (1949). The chief distinction made here is that a wife is ordinarily
granted a divorce for cruelty on less provocation than a husband. Woolley v.
Woolley, 113 Utah 391, a95 P.2d 743, 744 (1948).
7The appeal was actually taken from a refusal to dismiss upon the facts as
set forth in the wife's amended answer. These are the facts as found by the special
master upon re-referral of the cause to him by the chancellor: The defendant wife
went to the plaintiff husband's place, the marital abode, for dinner. A violent
argument developed, during the course of which the wife received a broken wrist.
The plaintiff took his wife to the hospital and paid for her bill there. After the
wife's release from the hospital she returned to the marital home, with her per-
sonal effects, and she shared the same bed with plaintiff. It was admitted by both
parties that they had indulged in sexual intercourse. Seiferth v. Seiferth, 132 So.
2d 471, 473 (Fla. Ct. App. ig6i).
'The decision was three to one.
9All courts require forgiveness, either implied or express, by the aggrieved
spouse to constitute a valid defense of condonation. York v. York, 280 S.W.2d 553
(Ky. 1955); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 69 Nev. 176, 244 P.2d 381 (1952); Duff v. Duff,
126 N.E.2d 466 (Ohio Ct. App. 1954).
"1i32 So. 2d 471, 474 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961).
"Another problem which might have been behind this court's reluctance
to accept condonation as a defense in this case is the distinction frequently applied
by courts concerning condonation as a defense to a divorce based on the ground
of cruelty as opposed to one based on the ground of adultery because of the dif-
ferent character of the offenses. 'Wolverton v. 'Wolverton, 163 Ind. 26, 71 N.E. 123
(i9o4); Brown v. Brown, 171 Kan. 249, 232 P.2d 6o3 (i95i); Weber v. Weber, 195
Mo. App. 126, 189 S.W 577 (1916); Ramsay v. Ramsay, 69 Nev. 176, 244 P.2d
381 (1952); Fisher v. Fisher, 223 App. Div. 19, 227 N.Y. Supp. 345 (1st Dep't 1928);
Wilson v. 'Wilson, 16 R.I. 122, 13 ALI. 1o2 (1888); Humphreys v. Humphreys, 39
Tenn. App. 99, 281 S.W.2d 270 (1954); Cudahy v. Cudahy, 217 Wis. 355, 258 N.W.
168 (1935)-
There have been many cases holding that the resumption of marital relations
constitutes condonation of cruelty. Obennoskey v. Obennoskey, 2i4 Ark. 358, 220
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sider the "overwhelming weight of authority,"' 2 which denies relief
to the parties who cohabit during pendency of a suit for divorce.'
3
This view is typically reflected by the words of a New York court:
14
"We think it is contrary to the policy of the law and incongruous to
separate parties judicially who have not separated themselves."'1 The
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Tarr v. Tarr,16 added its sup-
port to this view with these graphic words: "It would be shocking to
the moral sense for a court of equity to grant a divorce to parties,
who, during the pendency of the suit, litigated by day and copulated
by night."'7
While the authorities denying relief to parties who cohabit during
the pendency of a divorce action are unanimous in their conclusion,
they are also unanimous in refraining from enunciating the exact
reasons behind their conclusion.' 8 One can speculate as to the reasons.
Possibly a kind of the "clean hands" doctrine' 9 is involved. This
would not be an application of the doctrine in its usual sense, t.e.,
denial of relief to a wrongdoer,20 but rather a denial of relief to parties
S.W.2d 61o (1949); Buck v. Buck, 205 Ark. 918, 171 S.W.2d 939 (1943); Johnson v.
Johnson, 21o Ga. 795, 82 S.E.2d 831 (1954); Moore v. Moore, 362 Ill. 177, 199 N.E.
98 (1935); Babcock v. Babcock, 317 Mass. 772, 59 N.E.2d 471 (1944); Sewell, v.
Sewell, i6o Neb. 173, 69 N.W.2d 549 (1955); Shinn v. Shinn, 148 Neb. 832, 29
N.W.2d 629 (1947); Lazarczyk v. Lazarczyk, 122 Misc. 536, 203 N.Y. Supp. 291
(Sup. Ct. 1924); Greer v. Greer, 178 Pa. Super. 643, 115 A.2d 794 (1955); Brooks v.
Brooks, 2oo Va. 530, io6 S.E.2d Gi1 (1959). But see Cox v. Cox, 343 S.W.2d 395
(Ky. 1961); Nixon v. Nixon, 329 Pa. 256, 198 At. 154 (1938); Hollister v. Hollister,
6 Pa. 449 (1847).
'The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that when the parties
to a suit for divorce have... resumed their marital relations, such action operates
to end the litigation." Givens v. Givens, 304 S.V.2d 577, 58o (Tex. Civ. App. 1957).
"Holt v. Holt, 77 F.2d 538 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Baumgartner v. Baumgartner,
16 Ill. App. 2d 286, 148 N.E.2d 327 (1958); Vnght v. Wright, 153 Neb. 18, 43 N.W.2d
424 (195o); Ross v. Ross, 4 Misc. 2d 3992 149 N.Y.S.2d 585 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Sommer
v. Sommer, 285 App. Div. 8og, 137 N.Y.S.2d i (ist Dep't 1955); McCarthy v. Mc-
Carthy, 199 Misc. 680, 103 N.Y.S.2d 8o8 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1951); Berman v. Berman,
277 App. Div. 56o, 1o N.Y.S.2d 2o6 (ast Dep't 195o); Tarr v. Tarr, 184 Va. 443,
35 S.E.2d 4o (1945).
UBerman v. Berman, 277 App. Div. 560, 1o1 N.Y.S.2d 2o6 (ist Dep't 195o).
25d., ioi N.Y.S.2d at 207.
1184 Va. 443, 35 S.E.2d 401 (1945).
17184 Va. at 449, 35 S.E.2d at 4o4.
u8Typical of the language of the courts in this respect is the language of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska: "It is elementary that while a divorce is pending
the parties must live separate and apart." Ellis v. Ellis, 115 Neb. 685, 214 N.W 300,
301 (1927).
1nhe doctrine that he who comes into equity must come with clean hands
has been held applicable to divorce cases. Fritz v. Fritz, 179 Ore. 512, 174 P.2d 169,
174 (1946); Nelson, Divorce and Annulment § 1.o3 (1945).
2°Generally the clean hands principle is applied when the party seeking re-
1!962]
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who, through their actions out of court, show a lack of good faith
in participating in the suit.21 Professor Chafee in an exhaustive article
criticizing the application of the clean hands doctrine to matrimonial
litigation wrote: "It was an evil day when the first American judge to
speak of clean hands had the bright idea of injecting the maxim
into the very place where it would work its greatest mischief." 22 Per-
haps he would not object to this application of the doctrine. The
chief objection of Chafee and others to the use of a clean hands doc-
trine in divorce actions lies in the intolerable position in which the
parties are left after its invocation.23 This objection hardly applies
where the parties show by their actions during the pendency of the
suit that their position after denial of'relief will not be intolerable.
2 4
Another possible reason behind the conclusion of the majority view
may be some idea of estoppel. Estoppel has been applied to divorce
actions where lack of good faith has been shown.25 It would not be
an unwarranted extension to invoke an estoppel on the ground that
the party is asking for judicial relief wholly inconsistent with his extra-
judicial conduct.
The foregoing considerations point to the denial of relief where
the parties have cohabited during the pendency of their suit for
divorce. But a contrary result can be reached if the strong policy
favoring reconciliation of the spouses26 is considered controlling. It
is arguable that this policy favoring reconciliation will best be served
by allowing the parties to cohabit during the pendency, of their di-
vorce suit. They are then permitted to remain in the best possible
lief is himself guilty of some wrongdoing in connection with the lawsuit. Rhine
v. Terry, iii Colo. 506, 143 P.2d 684, 685 (1943); Christensen v. Christensen, x44
Neb-763, 14 N.W.2d 613, 616 (1944); Hartiman v. Cohn, 35o Pa. 41, 38 A.9d 22,
25 (1944).
2'Lack of good faith has been described as one of the bases underlying the
clean hands maxim. Vulcan Detirning Co. v. American Can Co., 72 N.J.Eq. 387,
67 Ad. 339, 341 (1907); Canfield v. Jack, 78 Okla. 127, 188 Pac. 1o4o (192o).
21Chafee, Coming into Equity with Unclean Hands, 47 Mich L. Rev. 877, io83
(1949).2Id. at io88.
mThe parties in the Seiferth case have shown by their actions that living to-
gether is not an intolerable situation.
mStafford v. Stafford, 163 Kan. 162, 181 P.2d 491 (1947); Bohmert v. Bohmert,
213 App. Div. io3, 21o N.Y. Supp. i (ist Dep't 1925); Deutsch v. Deutsch, 141 Pa.
Super. 339, 14 A.2d 586 (i94o).
26Many courts have enunciated this policy favoring reconciliation. DeBurgh
v. DeBurgh, 39 Cal. 2d 858, 250 P.2d 598 (1952); Pilliner v. Pilliner, 64 Idaho 425,
133 P.gd 735 (1943); Diamond v. Diamond, 182 Md. 103, 32 A.2d 376 (1943);
Iovino v. lovino, 58 N.J. Super, 138, 155 A.2d 578 (App. Div. 1959); Brown v.
Brown, 2o8 N.Y. Supp. 17 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
